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Abstract—We consider the problem of designing PIR scheme
on coded data when certain nodes are unresponsive. We provide
the construction of ν-robust PIR schemes that can tolerate
up to ν unresponsive nodes. These schemes are adaptive and
universally optimal in the sense of achieving (asymptotically)
optimal download cost for any number of unresponsive nodes
up to ν.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a user who wishes to download a certain file from
a distributed storage system (DSS) while keeping the identity
of this file private. The user’s concern about his/her privacy
is due to many causes, such as concern about surveillance,
protection against online profiling from companies, etc. Private
information retrieval (PIR) schemes [1], [2] allow a user to
achieve privacy by querying the different nodes in the system,
while guaranteeing that no information is being revealed
about which file is being retrieved. A straightforward PIR
scheme consists of the user downloading all the files in the
DSS, achieving perfect privacy. However, it has a very high
communication cost. The literature on PIR has focused on
efficient schemes that can achieve privacy while minimizing
different system costs, and in particular, the communication
cost, which has received the most attention [3].
Since its introduction in [1], the model of PIR assumes the
data to be replicated on multiple nodes (e.g. [4]–[8]). Recently,
there has been a growing interest in using codes in DSS to
minimize the storage overhead of data. This has motivated
recent works on PIR schemes for data stored under coded
form and not just replicated [9]–[16]. The next example, taken
from [11], [12], illustrates the construction of a PIR scheme
on coded data.
Example 1: Consider a DSS with n = 4 nodes storing
m files Xi = (ai, bi), ai, bi ∈ GF (3
ℓ), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The files are stored using an (n, k) = (4, 2) MDS code
over GF (3). Let A =
[
a1 a2 . . . am
]T
, and B =
[
b1 b2 . . . bm
]T
represent the first and second half
(block) all the files in the DSS, respectively. Nodes 1, . . . , 4
store A,B,A + B,A + 2B, respectively. The user requires
to retrieve file Xf = (af , bf), f ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, privately,
by querying the four nodes, but without revealing any in-
formation about the file index f to any of them. In the
scheme in [11], [12], the user generates an iid random vector
u =
[
u1 . . . um
]T
with elements chosen uniformly at
random from GF (3) and independent of f , and forms the
vector ef =
[
0f−1 1 0m−f
]T
. Then, the user sends the
query vectors u to nodes 1 and 2 and u + ef to nodes 3
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and 4. Each node responds by projecting its data onto the
query vector it receives. Therefore, the responses of nodes
1, . . . , 4 are given by uTA, uTB, uTA + uTB + af + bf ,
u
TA + 2uTB + af + 2bf , respectively. From the responses
of the nodes, the user will be able to obtain privately file
Xf = (af , bf). We measure the efficiency of a PIR scheme
by its relative download cost referred to as communication
price of privacy (cPoP ). To retrieve 2 file symbols, the
scheme downloads 4 implying cPoP = 4/2 = 2, which is
asymptotically optimal (as m→∞) [10], [13].
In the previous scheme in Example 1 and its generalization
in [11], [12], the user needs to wait for the responses of
all the nodes to be able to decode the file. However, this
may not be possible in many cases due to some nodes being
unresponsive or due to network failures. Even when all the
nodes are responsive, some of them may be slow (due to being
busy or due to a slow connection). A single slow node will
delay the user, even if all the other nodes are fast. In this case,
it may be better for the user to “cut” the slow node, consider
it unresponsive and re-query the fast nodes. We are interested
in constructing PIR schemes that have this adaptive property.
A PIR scheme that can work even in the presence of
unresponsive servers has been studied in the literature in
the case of replicated data, and is called robust PIR scheme
[17]–[19]. We say that a PIR scheme is ν-robust if it can
tolerate ν unresponsive or slow servers. The standard method
for achieving robustness is to design the queries such that
the nodes’ responses contain enough redundancy to tolerate ν
erasures. In analogy with the existing work in the literature,
we aim at designing ν-robust PIR schemes that can operate on
coded and not only on replicated data. However, we require
the additional property that the scheme is universally optimal,
in the sense of achieving the minimum cPoP simultaneously
for any number of unresponsive nodes up to ν of them.
Therefore, we avoid having to design the scheme for the worst-
case scenario assuming the maximum number of unresponsive
nodes.
Example 1 (continued): Consider again the same setting as
before. We want to design a universal 1-robust PIR scheme.
We propose an adaptive scheme with two layers. The first
layer is the same one described in the previous part of this
example. If there is no unresponsive nodes the scheme stops
after the first layer. The second layer depends on which node
is unresponsive, or deemed slow, and is described in table I.
Suppose, for example, that node 1 is not responsive. In this
case, the user will be missing uTA (the response of node 1)
and needs it to be able to decode using the 3 other responses
from the first layer. The goal of the second layer is to retrieve
Node 1 u
Layer 1 Layer 2
∅
Node 1 is
unresponsive
v
Node 2 is
unresponsive
v + ef
Node 3 is
unresponsive
v + ef
Node 4 is
unresponsive
Node 2 u v ∅ v v
Node 3 u+ ef v + u v + u ∅ v
Node 4 u+ ef v v v ∅
TABLE I: An example of our proposed 1-universal and adap-
tive robust PIR scheme. The scheme has two layers, with ∅
indicating the unresponsive node.
u
TA or another linear combination that allows full decoding in
the first layer. Only nodes 3 and 4 can give uTA, but if the user
asks directly for it in Layer 2 it will reveal ef to the node and
therefore the identity of the requested file. That’s why the user
generates a new random vector v =
[
v1 . . . vm
]T
with
elements ∈ GF (3). Implementing the queries in the second
column in Table I, the user can decode uTA+uTB in layer 2,
and then Xf using the responses from layer 1. This schemes
achieves asymptotically optimal cPoP simultaneously for 0
unresponsive nodes (cPoP = 2) and 1 unresponsive node
(cPoP = 3), as given in (1) explained later.
Related work: Until recently, most of the work on PIR has
focused on replicated data and minimizing the total download
cost [4]–[8], [20]–[22]. Recent work has studied PIR schemes
on coded data. It was shown in [9] that downloading one extra
bit is enough to achieve privacy, if the number of servers is
exponential in the number of files. In [10], the authors derive
bounds on the tradeoff between storage cost and download
cost for linear coded data. Later, the authors in [13] derive
the optimal lower bounds on download cost. Methods for
transforming PIR schemes with replicated data to schemes
on coded data were devised in [14]. This work was later
generalized to PIR array codes in [15]. PIR schemes for MDS
coded data were presented in [11], [12]. For the case of non-
colluding nodes, these schemes achieve asymptotically optimal
download cost. A new family of PIR schemes on MDS coded
data was constructed in [16], which achieves a lower download
cost then the ones in [11] for the case of colluding nodes. In
terms of fundamental limits, it was shown in [4] that the so-
called PIR capacity is (1 + 1/n+ 1/n2 + · · ·+ 1/nm−1)−1,
which implies optimal cPoP = 1+1/n+1/n2+· · ·+1/nm−1,
where n is the number of nodes and m is the number of files.
This capacity expression was then generalized to the case of
a fixed number of colluding nodes in [5]. All the previous
fundamental results are for replicated data. When the data is
coded using an (n, k) MDS code, it was shown in [13] that
the optimal cPoP is 1 + k/n+ k2/n2 + · · ·+ km−1/nm−1,
thus the asymptotically optimal cPoP = n
n−k
, as the number
of files m goes to infinity. The setting in which nodes can be
byzantine (malicious) and store replicated data was considered
in [17]–[19] and robust PIR schemes were devised using
locally decodable codes.
Contributions: In this paper, we present a construction of
universal ν-robust PIR schemes on (n, k) MDS coded data,
where ν is the maximum number of unresponsive nodes1.
We focus on non-colluding nodes (i.e., no spy nodes in the
model in [11], [12]) and want to achieve perfect privacy which
guarantees that zero information is leaked to the individual
nodes about the index of the retrieved file. The construction
is a generalization of our PIR schemes on MDS codes in
[11], with robustness against up to ν unresponsive nodes. The
proposed scheme consists of two layers and has the following
properties: (i) universality, meaning the scheme allows the
user to retrieve the requested file privately, for all number
of unresponsive servers up to ν, and achieving the optimal
cPoP = n−i
n−i−k
for all i = 1, . . . , ν, where i is the actual
number of unresponsive nodes; and (ii) adaptivity, meaning the
scheme changes depending on which nodes do not respond.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND MAIN RESULT
We adopt the same model in [11] and summarize it here.
DSS: We consider a distributed storage system (DSS) formed
of n nodes indexed from 1 to n. The DSS stores m files,
X1, . . . , Xm using an (n, k) MDS code over GF (q), which
achieves reliability against n − k node failures. Each file Xi
is divided into k blocks, and each block is divided into α
stripes or subdivisions. Thus, a file Xi could be represented
by a k × α matrix with symbols chosen from the finite field
GF (qℓ). The stripes are considered to be encoded separately
using the generator matrix of the same MDS code. We assume
the user knows the encoding vector used to encode the data
on each node. We denote the column vector stored on node
i by Wi ∈ GF (q
ℓ)mα. For instance, in Example 1, α = 1,
W1 = A,W2 = B,W3 = A+ B,W4 = A + 2B, and q = 5.
We assume the MDS code code is given and is not a design
parameter.
PIR: The user wants to retrieve file Xf , from n nodes,
privately, meaning without revealing the index, f , to any of
the nodes. We assume that the nodes in the DSS do not
collude and that f is chosen uniformly at random from the
set {1, . . . ,m}. We say that a PIR scheme over GF (q) is
linear, and of dimension d, when the request sent to node
i is a d × mα query matrix, Qi, over GF (q). In this case,
the response of a node is the projection of its data onto the
query matrix. We want the PIR scheme to achieve perfect
privacy, i.e., H(f |Qi) = H(f), for all i. Here, H(.) denotes
the entropy function.
Definition 1 (Universal ν-robust PIR scheme): A universal
ν-robust PIR scheme is a PIR scheme which can tolerate up
to ν unresponsive nodes, and for any number of unresponsive
nodes 0 ≤ i ≤ ν, it achieves perfect privacy with minimum
cPoP given by (assuming no node collusion)
cPoP =
ni
ni − k
, (1)
where ni = n− i is the number of responsive nodes.
1The parameter ν can be between 0 and n− k− 1. A 0-robust scheme is
a non-robust scheme. If ν = n− k, i.e., there is no redundant data queried,
then perfect privacy can not be achieved except by downloading all the files.
If ν > n− k, the file can not be fully retrieved since the MDS code cannot
tolerate more than n− k failures.
Theorem 1 gives the main result of this paper and is proved
in Section IV.
Theorem 1: Consider a DSS with n non-colluding nodes
and using an (n, k) MDS code over GF (q). Then, the linear
PIR scheme over GF (q) described in Section III is a universal
ν-robust PIR scheme, i.e., it achieves perfect privacy and and
has optimal cPoP = ni
ni−k
, where ni = n− i, for all number
of unresponsive nodes i, 0 ≤ i ≤ ν.
III. ROBUST PIR SCHEME DESCRIPTION
We describe here the universal PIR scheme referred to in
Theorem 1. This scheme is adaptive and consists of two layers.
A. Layer 1 is essentially multiple copies of the non-robust
PIR scheme of Theorem 1 in [11]. This scheme requires a
number of subdivisions α = LCM(k,n−k)
k
and is of dimension
d′ = LCM(k,n−k)
n−k
, i.e., it consists of d′ subqueries.
WLOG, we assume the code is systematic and write n−k =
βk+ r, where β and r are integers and 0 ≤ r < k and β ≥ 0.
We divide the nodes into groups, as seen in Table II. The first
group consists of k nodes and is divided into two sub-groups.
The first consists of r nodes, which are chosen to be the first
r nodes for the first subquery. The second is formed of the
remaining k−r nodes. As for the parity nodes, we divide them
into β groups of k nodes each, and one group of r nodes.
Table II describes the first subquery of the PIR scheme when
the user wants file Xf . The user generates a random vector u,
whose elements are chosen uniformly at random from GF (q),
the same field over which the MDS code is defined. Next,
we summarize how the remaining subqueries are constructed.
For each subquery j, j = 2, . . . , d′, a new random vector vj
is created. The subqueries to the first group, assumed to be
systematic, are shifted cyclically downwards in each subquery.
As for the remaining β groups of k nodes each, the query to
each group s is vj + e(f−1)α+r+(s−2)d+j , where vector ej is
the all-zero vector with a single 1 in position j. As for the
last r nodes, the random vector vj is sent in subquery j.
The number of subdivisions for a non-robust scheme on an
(ni, k)MDS code is αi =
LCM(k,ni−k)
k
, and the dimension or
number of subqueries of the PIR scheme is d′i =
LCM(k,ni−k)
ni−k
.
To achieve a universal ν-robust PIR scheme on (n, k) MDS
code, we need enough “granularity” to account for the different
number i of unresponsive nodes, for i = 0, . . . , ν. The number
of subdivisions α for a universal ν-robust PIR scheme is the
LCM of the number of subdivisions, αi, of the scheme for
all possible numbers of responsive servers ni.
α = LCM(α1, . . . , αi). (2)
The number of subqueries sent in layer 1 is d0 = d
′
0 ×
α
α0
.
For this, d0 random vectors u1, . . . ,ud0 are created (one ran-
dom vector per subquery). Every α0 subdivisions are queried
in a set of d′0 subqueries.
B. Layer 2 depends on which nodes are unresponsive. Thus,
the user will cut those nodes off and compensate for the
responses from these nodes using extra subqueries to the other
ni nodes. The goal of layer 2 is to allow the user to recover the
responses that were missed in layer 1. However, this should
Nodes Queries
G
ro
u
p
1
1 u+ e(f−1)α+1
2 u+ e(f−1)α+2
.
.
.
.
.
.
r u+ e(f−1)α+r
r + 1
u
.
.
.
k
G
ro
u
p
2
k + 1
u+ e(f−1)α+r+1
.
.
.
2k
.
.
.
.
.
.
G
ro
u
p
β
+
1 βk + 1
u+ e(f−1)α+r+(β−1)d+1
.
.
.
(β + 1)k
G
ro
u
p
β
+
2 (β + 1)k + 1
u
.
.
.
n
TABLE II: First subquery, in the non-robust PIR scheme in
[11] (no collusion), assuming the user wants file Xf .
be accomplished without violating the privacy constraint. Let
us suppose ni is the number of responsive nodes in layer 1.
Hence, in each copy of the scheme in layer 1, there are
(n0 − ni) × d0 sub-responses missing. The goal of layer 2
is to recover these sub-responses. We will divide the missing
parts into di− d0 groups of size ni− k. Each of these groups
will be asked for in one subquery, in the way a subquery is
sent in an (ni, k) system to decode ni−k parts in [11]. There
are two cases:
• Case 1: If the missing part is a function of ej the user
shall send ej + us, where us is a new random vector,
to one of the responsive nodes which never received a
query on ej in the previous subqueries. For instance, if
the required file is X1, e1, . . . , er are asked for in group
1, so to ask for them in the second layer, the user should
ask them from any group other than group 1.
• Case 2: On the other hand, if the missing part is a
“purely” randomvector (uj , for any 1 ≤ j ≤ d0), the user
shall send uj +us to one of the responsive nodes which
never received a query uj in the previous subqueries. For
instance, to ask for a pure random vector ui in layer 2, it
should not be queried from group β. Also, it should not
be asked for from the k − r nodes in group 1 that have
been asked for a purely random vector in subquery j.
After setting those, the random vector ui will be sent to the
rest of the nodes (k nodes), in this subquery i.
A. Example on Scheme Construction
Example 2 (Universal 2-robust PIR): Consider the (5, 2)
systematic MDS code storing m files. Nodes 1, 2, . . . 5 store
A,B,A+ B,A+ 2B,A+ 3B, respectively, where A and B
are as defined in example 1. We want a universal 2-robust
PIR scheme, a PIR scheme that will be optimal in terms of
node 1
Layer 1
u1 + e1 u2
Layer 2
∅ u3 + u1 u3 + e2 u3 + e2 u3 + u1
node 2 u1 u2 + e1 u3 + u2 ∅ u3 + e3 u3 + e3 u3 + u2
node 3 u1 + e2 u2 + e3 u3 + e1 u3 + e1 ∅ u3 u3
node 4 u1 + e2 u2 + e3 u3 u3 u3 ∅ u3
node 5 u1 u2 u3 u3 u3 u3 ∅
TABLE III: Queries to the nodes when one node is unresponsive. The 2 columns in Layer 1 represent the queries to all the
nodes. Depending on which node is unresponsive (designated with ∅), one column in Layer 2 is chosen to query.
communication price of privacy (cPoP ) if 5 nodes, 4 nodes,
and 3 nodes respond. Let us call n0 = 5, n1 = 4, n2 = 3.
We consider the number of subdivisions and dimension of
each code. For the (5, 2) code, α0 = 3 and d
′
0 = 2, for the
(4, 2), α1 = 1 and d
′
1 = 1, and for (3, 2), α2 = 1 and d
′
2 = 2.
For the code to tolerate failures, we need to subdivide the
files into α = LCM(α0, α1, α2) = 3.
The number of subqueries required in order to retrieve the
α parts of the file for code (ni, k) will be
di = d
′
i ×
α
αi
. (3)
Thus, d0 = 2, d1 = 3, d2 = 6.
Layer 1: Suppose the user wants X1. The user first sends
subqueries to the 5 nodes expecting all of them to respond.
We use here the PIR scheme in [11] for the case of a (5, 2)
MDS code. The user creates random vectors u1, u2, and send
the queries as in layer 1 of table III.
Layer 2:
Case 1: If one node does not respond, the user compensates
for the missing information and sends an extra query to the
other 4 nodes. In one query to a (4, 2) system, the user can
decode privately 2 parts. In a (4, 2) system each query can
give us 2 parts, thus 1 extra query can compensate for the
unresponsive node, this matches the number of subqueries
being 3. We generate a new random vector u3 for this extra
query.
Column i in layer 2 shows the subquery when node i does
not respond. For example, when node 1 does not respond. We
see that we are missing equation with u1 + e1, which is case
1 and u2 which is case 2. For this, we will send a u3 +u2 to
node 2 and u3 + e1 to node 3. Of course, then we send u3 to
nodes 1 and 4 to decode the interference. Table III shows the
sent queries.
Case 2: On the other hand, if two nodes do not respond, then
we need 4 extra subqueries. For example, if nodes 1 and 3
do not respond, there are 4 missing responses. Three of those
missing parts are of case 1, e1, e2, and e3, and one missing
part is of case 2, u2. The queries in this case are shown in
table IV.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Before giving the proof of the theorem, we will state two
properties of the PIR scheme in Theorem 1 in [11] that will
be essential to prove Theorem 1.
Property 1: In the PIR scheme in [11], the query vectors
in each sub-query can be permuted among the nodes without
affecting the decodability and the privacy properties of the
1
Layer 1
u1 + e1 u2
Layer 2
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
2 u1 u2 + e1 u3 u4 u5 + e2 u6 + e3
3 u1 + e2 u2 + e3 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
4 u1 + e2 u2 + e3 u3 + e1 u4 + u2 u5 u6
5 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6
TABLE IV: Queries to the nodes when nodes 1 and 3 are
unresponsive
scheme. This follows directly from the fact that the node
groups (see for e.g. Table II) can be chosen arbitrarily.
Property 2: The scheme in [11] allows the user to retrieve
efX , which is, in other words, the file Xf . This can be
readily generlized to retrieve any uX , where u is any vector
of dimension m, where m is the number of files.
Let us start by proving the decodability of the example in
section III-A.
A. Example 2 decodability:
Let A and B be as defined in example 1.
Layer 1: The scheme’s decodability when all nodes respond
follows directly from [11].
Layer 2:We will prove that the scheme applied in section III-A
is decodable when node 1, for example, is unresponsive. The
nodes project the query vectors on the data they hold and send
the response back to the user.
• We notice that from the third subquery, the user decodes
the interference from nodes 3 and 4. Then gets a11+ b11
and uT2 B.
• From the first subquery, a12 + 2b12 and a12 + 3b12 can
be retrieved and thus decoding a12 and b12.
• From uT2 B and the response of node 4 in the second
query, the user decodes the interference uT2 A and u
T
2 B.
The user can then retrieve b11, a13+ b13, and a13+2b13.
From these equations, along with a11 + b11 retrieved
from the third subquery (second layer), the user decodes
a11, b11, a13, and b13.
Thus decoding all parts of the file 1. The cPoP of the
scheme if one node is unresponsive is 12 × 16 = 2 which is
the same as the optimal cPoP found in [13]. When 2 nodes
do not respond, if we look at the query table IV, we notice
that the missing parts are retrieved, and achieve cPoP = 3.
B. Decodability:
Layer 1: If n0 = n nodes respond, the decodability follows
from [11]. Every α0 parts are decoded in d
′
0 subqueries,
thus retrieving the complete file (i.e. α parts) in d0 =
d′0α
α0
subqueries.
Layer 2: If ni out of the n nodes respond, si = (n0−ni)×d0
responses are missing. In each extra subquery, the user can
decode ni − k parts. Thus in total, from the di − d0 extra
subqueries the user can decode (ni − k) × (di − d0) parts.
We can see that (ni − k)(di − d0) = d0 × (n0 − ni) = si,
by substituting the value of di by its expression in (3). This
shows that the number of decodable parts from the extra di−d0
subqueries is equal to the number of missing parts.
Now the question is whether the new sub-responses are able
to provide parts that are sufficient for the user to be able to
retrieve the file he/she wants.
Here, we use properties 1 and 2. Using property 1, we can
see that we can, in fact, decode ni−k parts in each subquery of
this layer, since those subqueries are similar to the schemes
in [11], only permuted. Using property 2, we can see that
if a missing response is a function of a random vector in a
subquery of layer 1, the user can hide the random vector using
the scheme in [11] and retrieve a new function, in layer 2, that
could substitute the missing response.
When all nodes are responsive, the responses from layer 1
form a set of k independent equations about the k blocks of
each stripe and about the interference, allowing the user to
decode the file. However, when some nodes are unresponsive,
some sub-responses, and therefore equations, are not retrieved.
In this layer, the extra subqueries should be able to provide
equations that will substitute those missing equations. Thus,
those extra sub-responses, along with the sub-responses from
layer 1, should form a system of k independent equations
about each stripe and interference.
The number of unresponsive nodes can be at most ν =
n− k − 1. The number of independent equations required to
retrieve a full stripe or to decode the interference is k. To
form a solvable system of equations about a stripe, a node is
asked at most once about the same stripe. Thus, the number of
missing sub-responses about a certain stripe or interference is
at most min(k, n−k−1). Consider the number of unretrieved
equations about a stripe is γ. Since there are at least k + 1
responding servers, there will always be at least γ nodes that
have not been asked for equations about this stripe before. The
user can query those nodes to retrieve new equations about this
stripe to substitute the missing ones.
Privacy: In each subquery, the query to a node is either one-
time padded by an independent vector or the independent
vector itself. Therefore, the privacy of the scheme follows from
the fact that the nodes do not collude.
Optimality: The price of privacy is optimal for any number of
responsive nodes ni ≥ nν , cPoP =
dini
kα
= ni
ni−k
, obtained
by substituting equations (2) and (3) into this equation.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of constructing robust PIR schemes
with low communication cost for requesting data from a DSS
storing data using MDS codes. The responses from certain
nodes may be very slow. In such case, the user would cut those
nodes off and ask the rest of the nodes for what he/she should
have received from this node. The objective is to allow the
user to do this with low communication cost. We constructed
adaptive universal ν-robust PIR schemes with non-colluding
nodes achieving the optimal price of privacy for all numbers
of responsive nodes. The next steps would be to look into
non-adaptive schemes, and schemes for colluding nodes.
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